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GOODBYE TO TLE DEFENSE OF
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Armstrong,1 the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine the standard of proof for a defendant in a criminal
prosecution to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution defense.
The five African-American defendants in Armstrong were arrested in
a multi-agency sting operation for selling cocaine base.2 They alleged
that they were targeted for federal prosecution because of their race,3
and claimed that they were entitled to discovery from the Government
because they met the threshold "colorable basis" standard.4 The
Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the wrong standard to the discovery motion by failing to require the
defendants to prove that "others similarly situated" were not prose-
cuted.5 Moreover, the Court found that selective prosecution de-
fenses are different from other defenses bearing directly on the merits
of the case-in-chief, and, therefore, discovery of selective prosecution
claims is not covered by Federal Criminal Rule of Procedure 16.6 The
case was remanded for further proceedings. 7
This note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Armstrong imposes a barrier that is too high for almost any
defendant alleging selective prosecution to obtain discovery, thus
making the already difficult claim of race-based selective prosecution
virtually impossible to prove. Additionally, this note argues that the
Court should have adopted Justice Marshall's three-prong test from
his dissent in Wayte v. United States,8 which requires a defendant to
meet a lower threshold to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution
defense than to prove the claim on the merits at trial.
1 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
2 Id at 1483.
3 Id
4 Id- at 1488.
5 Id.
6 Id at 1485-86.
7 Id. at 1489.
8 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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II. BACKGROUND
A selective prosecution defense arises when a prosecutor brings
charges against a defendant deliberately motivated by constitutionally
prohibited "standard[s] such as race, religion or other arbitrary classi-
fication."9 The claim of selective prosecution is based upon Equal
Protection considerations, in which a "defendant may demonstrate
that the administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons... with a mind so unequal and
oppressive' that the system of prosecution amounts to 'a practical de-
nial' of equal protection of the law."' 0
In general, selective prosecution claims can be divided into two
subsets: those based on claims of racial discrimination; and those
based on other constitutionally impermissible infringements, such as
First Amendment violations," prosecution of repeat offenders,' 2 or
cases involving alien defendants charged with reentering the United
States after a prior deportation.' 3 Moreover, a distinction must also
be drawn between a selective prosecution claim based upon a civil suit
for injunctive relief against the individual prosecutor 4 and that as-
serted as a defense to a criminal charge,' 5 because there are different
quantums of proof necessary to establish a viable claim.16
A. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION DEFENSES UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
COMPONENT OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
1 7
The first two selective prosecution cases the Supreme Court en-
9 Id. at 608 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
10 Armstrong 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (quotingYickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373 (1886)).
11 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
12 See, e.g., Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
13 See, e.g., United States v. AlJibori, 90 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 1996).
14 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1979) (denying standing to civil
rights plaintiffs who were black residents of a Chicago suburb alleging past selective prose-
cution because the plaintiffs failed to prove that they would be targets of discriminatory
prosecution in the future). See also Phelps v. Hamilton, 934 F. Supp. 373 (D. Kan. 1996)
(refusing to grant plaintiff standing to seek order enjoining district attorney from prosecut-
ing plaintiff under Kansas criminal defamation statute).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). See also P.S. Kane, Com-
ment, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion for Selective Prosecution,
67 TuL L RE V. 2293, 2300-03 (1993) (discussing the difference between civil suits for
injunctive relief and claims raised as a defense in criminal actions and noting how neither
remedy is usually successful).
16 See generay Angela Davis, Tonry: Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in America,
94 MicH. L RE%. 1660, 1678-80 (1996) (book review).
17 The Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Additionally, the Supreme Court asserted that "[Our] approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has ... been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420
U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975), quoted in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 609 n.9 (1985).
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countered involved challenges by Chinese citizens to local ordinances
in San Francisco.18 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,19 the Supreme Court found
that San Francisco authorities selectively enforced zoning ordinances
against resident Chinese, but almost never against whites. 20 Although
facially neutral, the Court found that the San Francisco ordinances
were enforced on a discriminatory basis, relying on the statistical dis-
parity between Chinese and non-Chinese applicants for wooden laun-
dry licenses.2 1 The Court observed:
[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appliance, yet,
if it is applied... with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the constitution. 22
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court directly addressed a claim
of selective prosecution in Ah Sin v. Witman,23 though the Court re-
jected the respondent's allegations.24 Ah Sin, a Chinese citizen, peti-
tioned a California state court for a writ of habeas corpus.25 He
alleged that a San Francisco county ordinance prohibiting persons
from setting up gaming tables in rooms barricaded to stop police
from entering violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ordi-
nance was enforced exclusively against persons of Chinese ancestry.26
The Court rejected this argument stating that "[there is no averment
that the conditions and practices to which the ordinance was directed
did not exist exclusively among the Chinese, or that there were other
offenders against the ordinances than the Chinese, as to whom it was
not enforced."27 As a result, since Ah Sin, to prove an equal protec-
tion violation, those asserting selective prosecution claims must estab-
lish that others similarly situated were not prosecuted.28
In Oyler v. Boyles,29 repeat offenders challenged a West Virginia
state law that imposed a requisite duty on prosecutors to seek
mandatory sentences.30 The petitioners argued that the prosecutors'
18 Ah Sin v. Whitman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
19 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
20 Id. at 374.
21 The Court found that 200 Chinese persons were denied licenses, while 80 non-Chi-
nese individuals were permitted to "carry on the same business under similar conditions."
Id at 374.
22 Id at 373-74.
23 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
24 Id at 507.
25 Id. 503-04.
26 Id at 504.
27 Id. at 507.
28 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1985).
29 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
30 Id. at 455.
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action denied "equal protection to those persons against whom the
heavier penalty is enforced."3' Rejecting the petitioner's contentions
as insufficient,3 2 the Court stated that
the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a
federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case
might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion or other arbitrary classification.33
Until Armstrong, Wayte v. United States3 4 set forth the most recent
iteration of the standards necessary to prove a selective prosecution
claim.35 In Wayte, the defendantwas charged with knowingly and will-
fully failing to register for the draft with the Selective Service. 6 The
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was
selectively prosecuted, since he and the other thirteen "vocal" oppo-
nents of the registration program were targeted out of an estimated
674,000 non-registrants.3 7 Setting forth a two-prong test, the Court
found that Wayte failed to prove that the government engaged in dis-
criminatory treatment and that the government was motivated by dis-
criminatory intent.38 The Majority focused both on the treatment of
the defendant as well as the motivation behind the prosecutor's deci-
sion to go forward with the charges.3 9 Lower courts thereafter used
this two-prong test.
31 Id at 451. Petitioners introduced evidence that 904 offenders "who were known of-
fenders throughout the state of West Virginia" were not sentenced under the mandatory
statutes and appended statistical date to support their contentions. Id. at 455. One peti-
tioner also alleged that out of six men prosecuted under the West Virginia statute, he was
the only one who was sentenced. Id. at 454-55.
32 Defendants in Oyler failed both to prove that prosecutors had knowledge of the de-
fendants' prior offenses, and that the prosecutors were motivated by discriminatory mo-
tives. Id. at 456.
33 Id
4 470 U.S. 598 (1985). See also Barry Lynn Creech, Note, AndJustice for All: Wayte v.
United States and the Defense of Slextive Prosecution, 64 N.C.L Rxv. 385 (1986).
-5 The standards developed in Wayte closely followed those in United States v. Berrios% 501
F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974). In Benio the defendant was charged with holding union office
within five years after a conviction for a felony for arson. Id. at 1209. Alleging a defense of
selective prosecution for his "outspoken" support of Senator McGovern in the 1972 Presi-
dential Race, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges after the Government failed to
comply with an order requiring disclosure of a memorandum. Id. at 1209-10. The Second
Circuit's requirement that the defendant provide "some evidence tending to show the
existence of the essential elements of the defense" became an oft-quoted threshold of
proof Id. at 1211.
36 470 U.S. at 603-04.
37 Id. at 604.




B. OTHER RELATED EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
In Batson v. Kentucky,40 the Court held that a defendant may es-
tablish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of
ajury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of pre-
emptory challenges.41 The defendant must prove that: (1) "he is a
member of a cognizable racial group;"42 (2) the prosecutor exercised
preemptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's race
from the venire;43 and (3) considering all relevant circumstances44
"[it raised] an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to ex-
clude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of the their
race."45 The Court held that once the defendant makes the relevant
showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to explain ade-
quately the racial exclusion.4 Moreover, the prosecution must "artic-
ulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried."47
Castaneda v. Partida48 addressed the question of an equal protec-
tion violation in grand jury selection. 49 The Mexican-American plain-
tiff in Castaneda alleged a denial of due process and equal protection
because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the
county grand jury that convicted him.50 Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun set forth a three-prong test for the party alleging the viola-
tion: (1) the party is a member of a group that "is a recognizable,
distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as
written or as applied;"51 (2) the party must prove exclusion by "com-
paring the proportion of the group in the total population to the pro-
portion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of
time;"52 and (3) that this selection is subject to abuse.53 This test es-
tablishes a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden
40 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
41 Id. at 89.
42 Id, at 96.
43 1&t
44 The Court suggested that relevant circumstances could be indicated in a "'pattern'
of strikes against black jurors" or by a "prosecutor's questions and statement during voir
dire." Id- at 97.
45 Id" at 96.
46 M at 97.
47 !Kt at 98.
48 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
49 Id. at 48-84.
50 Id. at 485-86.
51 let at 494.
52 Id.
53 Ide The Court stated that "a selection process that is susceptible of abuse or is not




then shifts to the state to rebut the case.54 In applying the test, the
Majority stated, "we prefer to look at all the facts that bear on the
issue, such as the statistical disparities, the method of selection, and
any other relevant testimony as to the manner in which the selection
process was implemented."55
C. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS HELD BY THE
GOVERNMENT
1. Civil Rules 26(b) and 34
In the civil context, liberal discovery is the cornerstone of the no-
tice pleading system envisioned by Judge Clark in establishing the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.56 Rule 26(b) governs the scope of
discovery,57 and Rule 34 controls the production of documents.58
Rules 26(b) and 34 were designed to work closely together.59 There
are four requirements that a party seeking discovery must meet under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34: 1) the requested discovery
must not be privileged;60 2) the requested discovery must be "relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or
defense of any other party;" 6' 3) the requested discovery must be in
the "possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the re-
quest is served;"62 and 4) trial preparation materials are available only
upon a showing "that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the papers... and that the party is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."
63
54 Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494-95.
55 I& at 500-01. The Supreme Court accepted a showing that Mexican-Americans were
underrepresented on the grand jury that had indicted the petitioner. Thus, while statisti-
cal analysis indicated that the overall Mexican-American population of the county was
79.1%, only 39% of persons summoned for grand jury service over an eleven-year period
were Mexican-American. Id. at 487-88.
56 See Richard Marcus, The Revival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986).
57 FED. R, Civ. P. 26.
58 FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
59 Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes.
60 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
61 J&
62 FED. it Cn- P. 34.
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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2. Criminal Rules 16(a)(1)(C) and (c)(2)
a. History
Adopted eight years after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were modeled on the experi-
ence and decisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 16
was amended in 1966, 1975, 1983; 1991 and 1993, each time increas-
ing the access of both defendants and prosecutors to more documents
or other items through discovery.65
Discovery under the federal criminal rules is substantially limited
as compared to the civil rules,66 and does not confer an automatic
right of discovery and opening up of governmental files.67 The judi-
cial practice of providing a criminal defendant with access to docu-
ments dates back to Justice Marshall's decision in United States v.
Burr,68 upholding a subpoena duces tecum issued before Aaron Burr's
indictment.69
When the original Rule 16 was promulgated in 1944, it was un-
clear under common law whether the right to discovery existed at
all.70 The original Rule was in effect from 1946 until 1966, and au-
thorized only a very limited right of discovery.71
64 MARK S. RHODES, 2 0RFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 16:2
(1985) [hereinafter ORFIELD'S FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES].
65 As the House Committee on theJudiciary's Report on the 1975 Amendments to the
Rules stated,
The Committee believes that it is desirable to promote greater pretrial discovery...
"[B]roader discovery by both the defense and the prosecution will contribute to the
fair and efficient administration of criminal justice by aiding in informed plea negotia-
tions, by minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at trial, and by otherwise con-
tributing to an accurate determination of the issue of guilt or innocence."
H.R. REP. No. 94-247, at 13 (1975), riprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. 674, 685 (quoting advi-
sory committee note).
66 ORFIELD'S FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES § 16:2.
67 Id. § 16:33. It is interesting to note that the 1975 Senate-House Conference Commit-
tee on proposed changes to the Rules rejected the House proposal that defined work prod-
uct in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3) ("the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the attorney for the government or other gov-
ernment agents") and adopted the current language instead ("reports, memoranda, or
other internal government documents").
68 25 F. Cas. 187 (1807). See also ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL RULES § 16:4.
69 25 F. Cas. at 191.
70 See 1944 advisory committee's comments to Rule 16 ("Whether under existing law
discovery may be permitted in criminal cases is doubtful.").
71 The original rule read in part,
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or informa-
tion the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible ob-
jects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure
or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the prepara-
tion of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 251 (2d ed. 1982).
[Vol. 87
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The 1966 amendment changed and substantially expanded the
Rule.7 2 The 1966 amendments required a defendant seeking discov-
ery to prove "materiality to the preparation of his defense and that his
request is reasonable."78 Earlier versions of the Rule had permitted
discovery of books, papers, documents or tangible objects only if they
were obtained from or belonged to the defendant.7 4 The 1966 Rule
also provided the government with work product immunity-reports,
memoranda and other internal government documents produced by
government agents in connection with a criminal case were exempt
from discovery.75 At the time, the changes were vigorously debated.76
As Justice Brennan noted, "few issues raise more sharply the basic ide-
ological clash between opposed theories of criminal justice."77
b. The Modern Rule
Rule 16 was substantially revised in 1974 to "give greater discovery
to both the prosecution and the defense."78 The current Rule
16(a) (1) (C) provides in part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defend-
ant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, pho-
tographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the gov-
ernment, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's
defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief
at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.79
The Advisory Committee stated that "[t]he rule is intended to
prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are
entitled. It is not intended to limit the judge's discretion to order
broader discovery in appropriate cases."80  As revised, Rule
16(a) (1) (C) eliminated the materiality and reasonableness standards
72 The 1966 Rule 16(b) read:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents,
tangible objects, buildings or places ... which are within the possession, custody or
control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of his
defense and that the request is reasonable . . .[T]his rule does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government docu-
ments made in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case ....
78 Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments.
74 WRIGHT, supra note 71, § 254.
75 See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments (citing examples of the legal
literature spawned by the problems); see also WRIGHT, supra note 71, § 252.
76 WRIGTrr, supra note 71, § 252.
77 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?
WASH. U. LQ. 279, 282 (1963).
78 The 1974 Amendments took effect on December 1, 1975.
79 FED R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (1) (C).
80 Notes of Advisory Committee on 1974 Amendments.
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found in earlier versions of the rule.81 Instead, disclosure was re-
quired if:
(a) the defendant shows that the disclosure of the document or tangible
object is material to the defense, (b) the government intends to use the
document or tangible object in its presentation of its case in chief, or (c)
the document or tangible object was obtained from or belongs to the
defendant.82
Rule 16(a) (2) was also clarified to "make clear that the work product
of the government attorney is protected."83 Rule 16(a) (2) exempts
from inspection by defendants "reports, memoranda, or other inter-
nal documents made by the attorney for the government or other gov-
ernment agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of
the case,"84 thereby limiting the scope of discovery.
3. Inherent Powers of the Court
Additionally, aside from the Federal Rules, courts are tradition-
ally said to possess inherent powers of ordering discovery.85 Thus, "to
the extent that Rule 16 does not express a policy prohibiting discovery
not explicitly authorized by the rules, the court is free, either by local
rules or by adjudication, to permit discovery on the basis of inherent
power."86
81 The Advisory Committee noted that it may be difficult for a defendant to make a
showing of materiality if he does not know what the evidence is. Id.
82 Advisory Committee Notes to 1975 Amendments. The reasonableness requirement
of prior versions was eliminated in the revision. According to Professor Wright, "Discovery
... which was discretionary prior to 1975 is now a matter of right if the conditions specified
in [16(a) (2)] (c) are satisfied." WRIGHT, supra note 71, § 254.
83 Advisory Committee Notes to 1975 Amendments.
84 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
85 ORFIELD'S FEDERAL CRIMINAL RuLEs § 16:51; WRIGHT, supra note 71, § 254. See also
Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556 (1911).
86 ORFILD'S FEDERAL CRIMINAL RuLs § 16:51. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) ("If no
procedure is specifically provided by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not
inconsistent with the rules or any applicable statute"); ORFIELD's FEDERAL CRIMINAL RuLES
§ 16:54. Additionally, while mentioning the importance of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), the Advisory Committee has never codified the Brady Rule. See Notes of Advisory
Committee on 1974 Amendments. In Brady, the Court held that the prosection's action in
withholding a statement favorable to the defendant when that statement was requested in
discovery violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 373 U.S. at 87.
The Court explained that a
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made avail-
able, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with the standards of justice ....
Id. Other limitations, such as theJencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, also operate independently
of the Federal Rules.
[Vol. 87940
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4. Justice Marshall's Dissent in Wayte v. United States
Until Armstrong, Justice Marshall's dissent in Wayte v. United States
was the only Supreme Court opinion that addressed the sufficiency of
a showing to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution case. 87 All
prior Supreme Court opinions concerned the claim of selective prose-
cution on the merits. 88
Justice Marshall argued that Wayte was, "first and foremost a dis-
covery dispute," 9 since the case arose after procedural wrangling be-
tween the defendants and the prosecution. After an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court for the Central District of California
granted the petitioners' request for discovery on their defense of se-
lective prosecution and directed the government to produce certain
documents.90 The government partially complied but refused to
hand over the remaining documents, claiming executive privilege. 91
As a result, Justice Marshall stated that,
Wayte need not have made out a full prima facie case in order to be
entitled to discovery. A prima facie case, of course, is one that if unre-
butted will lead to a finding of selective prosecution. It shifts to the Gov-
ernment the burden of rebutting the presumption of the
unconstitutional action. But a defendant need not meet this high bur-
den just to get discovery; the standard for discovery is merely
nonfrivolousness. 92
Adapting the three-prong test from Castaneda v. Partidag3 Justice Mar-
shall contrasted this "nonfrivolous" standard with a three part showing
that the defendant should make for a successful prima facie case. He
argued that the defendant must prove: (1) that he is a member of a
recognizable, distinct class; (2) that a disproportionate number of this
class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution; and (3)
that this selection was subject to abuse or was a not neutral process.94
Moreover, Justice Marshall believed that there should be a lower bur-
den for discovery in selective prosecution claims because "most of the
relevant proof... will normally be in the Government's hands."95
87 470 U.S. 598, 621 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting). The majority did not address the
discovery issue, claiming that it was not raised in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on
the merits, or at oral argument. Id. at 606 n.5. See also id. at 621 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
88 The crucial distinction between proving a claim of selective prosecution on the mer-
its and discovery of a claim is discussed at notes 235-42 infra and accompanying text.
89 470 U.S. at 621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9o Id. at 604.
91 I
92 Id at 625 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
93 430 U.S. 482, 490 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
94 470 U.S. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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D. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
1. Caselaw
Tradition gives prosecutors almost unbridled discretion in decid-
ing whom to charge, what the charge should be, and what plea bar-
gain terms should be offered. 6 Little judicial oversight is permitted
due to concerns regarding separation of powers, 97 high costs to the
criminal justice system,98 the guarantees of a speedy trial to the ac-
cused,99 a potential a chilling effect on law enforcement,100 as well as
the inherent institutional expertise of prosecutors. 01 There is also a
general presumption that the prosecution in a criminal case is under-
taken by the prosecutor in good faith. 10 2
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,10 3 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
leeway that should be accorded to prosecutors. 0 4 The court stated
that "so long as the prosector has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." 0 5
This broad deference to prosecutorial discretion was reaffirmed
in Wayte v. United States, where the Majority declared that the factors
behind whether to prosecute "are not readily susceptible to the kind
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake."10 6 The Court ex-
pressed concern regarding potentially negative impacts upon the judi-
cial system, such as delay, chilling effect upon law enforcement and an
undermining of prosecutorial effectiveness "by revealing the Govern-
ment's enforcement policy."10 7
96 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Developments In the Law: Race and the Crimi-
nal Process, Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision, 101 HARV. L. RE%,. 1520 (1988) [here-
inafter Developments]. See also P.S. Kane, supra note 15.
97 Article II of the United States Constitution grants to the executive branch the power
to "take care" that the laws are carried out. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
98 Seegeneraly United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (quoting Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
99 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
100 See generally Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
1 1 See generally Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfil-
ling the Promise of EqualJustice, 84 GEO. LJ. 2043, 2061-66 (1996).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995) (rejecting defend-
ants' contentions that prosecutors would abuse their plea bargaining power).
103 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
104 ld.
105 Id. at 364.
106 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
107 Id. See also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (holding that prose-
cutors, not the Court, should evaluate the strength of the case, the allocation of resources
and enforcement priorities); Id. at 397 n.7 ("the complexity of pretrial decisions by prose-
942 [Vol. 87
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2. Implications for Defendants
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandate a specific sentence
when certain elements are present in a particular case, thereby remov-
ing almost all discretion from federal trialjudges.'08 They also extend
drug penalty levels above the mandatory minimums.10 9 The guide-
lines are promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission"), which was established under the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984.110 Under the statute, the Commission is permitted to
submit changes in the guidelines to Congress.'1 ' The changes auto-
matically take effect 180 days after the submission unless Congress
blocks the changes." 2 In 1986 and 1988 Congress enacted mandatory
minimums for crack cocaine offenses.
Because of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and requisite
mandatory minimums, the decision whether to prosecute in federal
court or state court often means widely disparate prison terms for the
defendant."13 This disparity is particularly evident in cocaine cases,
cutors suggests that judicial evaluation of those decisions should be especially
deferential.").
108 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et. seq.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98. The Commission's initial guidelines
were submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987, and took effect on November 1, 1987. In
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the United States Sentencing Commission and the ability of the Commission to set
guidelines. The Court found that the Commission did not violate the separation of powers
and was not an improper delegation of legislative authority. Id. at 412.
109 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et. seq.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98.
110 Id.
11 Id.
112 As promulgated, Congress established a disparity in penalties for crack and powder
cocaine, which set out a 100 to 1 ratio. In early 1995, the United States Sentencing Com-
mission recommended, 4-3, that the Sentencing Guidelines be changed to treat crack and
powder cocaine alike for trafficking and for simple possession offenses. However, Con-
gress passed legislation blocking the changes in the Guidelines and President Clinton
signed into law a provision that retains the 100 to 1 ratio. SeeAct of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. I-
No. 104-38, 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. (109 Star.) 334 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 994 note); H.R.
REP. No. 104-272, repinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 335.
113 See Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 17, Armstrong (No. 95-157). The
defendants delineate the substantial difference in state versus federal court sentencing for
their charges:
Defendant California State Sentence Federal Sentence
Armstrong 3-9 years 55 years to life
Hampton 3-14 years mandatory life sentence
Mack 3-5 years 10 years to life
Martin 3-10 years 35 years to life
Rozelle 3-13 years 45 years to life
Id. at 18. The defendants also claim that the disparity between federal and state sentencing
is amplified by the fact that federal credit for "good time" is capped, while in the California
state penal system it is offered at a 1:1 ratio. 1d.
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where there is a significant racial disparity in crack versus powder co-
caine prosecution in recent years. The 1991 Household Survey indi-
cated that of those reporting crack use in the past year, whites
accounted for 52% of all powder cocaine users, blacks 38% and His-
panics 10%.114 Yet, there is a much wider racial disparity in prosecu-
tion for crack offenses. According to the Commission, in 1993 blacks
accounted for 88.3% of all defendants sentenced for federal crack co-
caine offenses, while whites accounted for only 4.1%.115
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
From February through April 1992, ajoint federal and state task
force comprised of detectives from the Narcotics Division of the In-
glewood, California Police Department and agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) infiltrated a suspected co-
caine base" 6 distribution ring, using three confidential informants. 117
On seven occasions from February 13, 1992, to April 6, 1992, the in-
formants purchased approximately 124.3 grams of cocaine base from
defendants Christopher Lee Armstrong, Aaron Hampton, Freddie
Mack, Sheldon Autwan Martin and Robert Rozelle. 18 The informants
also witnessed the defendants "carrying firearms during the sales."" 9
On April 8, 1992, task force police executed search warrants on
the hotel room in which the sales were transacted, °20 as well as on
residences belonging to certain defendants.12 1 The task force discov-
ered an additional 9.29 grams of cocaine base and a loaded gun in the
hotel room.12 2 The task force also arrested Defendants Armstrong
and Hampton in the hotel room.'2 3 Defendants Mack, Martin and
Rozelle were later arrested pursuant to bench warrants.' 2 4 As a result
of the investigation, the task force seized a total of approximately 135
114 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL. SENTENCING PouC, United
States Sentencing Commission, xi (Feb. 1995)
115 Id. Under the Guidelines, from 1989 to 1990, black offenders generally received
prison terms 41% longer on average than whites. See DouGLAS C. McDONALD & KENNETH
E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MAT-
TER? 1 (1993) (attributing the disparity to the difference in sentencing between crack co-
caine and powder cocaine).
116 Cocaine base is commonly known as "crack" or "rock."
117 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
118 Id. at 1483.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1483.
121 United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'den ban, 48 F.3d
1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
122 Id. at 1432.




grams of cocaine base and multiple firearms. 125
On April 21, 1992, a grand jury in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California indicted defendants Armstrong,
Hampton, Mack, Martin and Rozelle on charges of conspiring to pos-
sess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.126 Some of the defendants were also
charged with selling cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1),127 and
four of the defendants were indicted for using firearms in connection
with drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).1 28  All five
defendants are African-American. 2 9
On July 20, 1992, defendant Martin filed a Motion for Discovery
and/or Dismissal of Indictment for Selective Prosecution. 30 He al-
leged that the government prosecuted him on federal charges based
on his race,' 3 ' and sought discovery to obtain information he asserted
would support that claim.'32 The other four defendants timely joined
the motion, which was heard by the district court on September 8,
1992.133
In support of their motion, the defendants offered the affidavit of
a "Paralegal Specialist" employed by the Office of the Federal Public
Defender for the Central District of California.'m The affidavit al-
leged that every one of the twenty-four cases closed' 3 5 by the Federal
Public Defender's Office for the Central District of California during
1991 under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and/or 846 involved an African-Ameri-
125 Id.
126 Id. 21 U.S.C. § 846 reads: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which
may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
127 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 21
U.S.C. § 841(a) reads in part: "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intention-
ally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... "
128 Amstrong 48 F.3d at 1511; id. at 1522 (Rymer, J., dissenting). 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
reads in part:
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court
of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall, in addition to the punish-
ment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of impris-
onment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.
129 Armstrong 48 F.3d. at 1511.
1S0 Id.
131 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
132 Brief for the United States at 13, Armstrong (No. 95-157).
'33 Armstrong 48 F.3d at 1511.
134 Armstrong 116 S. Ct. at 1483.
135 A case is closed when it is settled, dismissed or there is a conviction of the defendant.
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can defendant.13 6 The affidavit was accompanied by a study listing the
twenty-four defendants, their race, whether they were prosecuted for
dealing cocaine in addition to cocaine base, and the status of each
case.137
The Government opposed the discovery motion, claiming that
the decision whether to prosecute the defendants was made in-
dependent of race.138 On September 8, 1992, the district court
granted the discovery motion, finding that the defendants' showing
was sufficient to justify discovery.13 9 The district court ordered the
Government to provide an explanation as to the number of cases at
issue, the similarity of the charges and the fact that all defendants
were of the same race.140 Specifically, the order required the Govern-
ment to: (1) provide a list of all cases from the previous three years in
which the Government charged both cocaine base offenses and fire-
arms offenses; 141 (2) identify the race of the defendants in those
cases; 142 (3) identify whether state, federal or joint law enforcement
authorities investigated each case; 143 and (4) explain the criteria used
by the U.S. Attorney's Office in deciding to prosecute those defend-
ants for federal cocaine base offenses. 144
On September 16, 1992, the Government moved for reconsidera-
tion of the district court's discovery order1 45 and submitted affidavits
from three law enforcement officers146 and two Assistant United
136 Armstrong, 116 S. CL at 1483.
137 Id. The filing stamp numbers on the closed cases in the study indicated that the
defendants were prosecuted over a four-year period. Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1522 (RymerJ.,
dissenting). Other defendants alleging selective prosecution defenses had introduced this
study in support of similar discovery motions in at least two other prosecutions in the
Central District of California. Armstrong, 116 S. CL at 1483 n.1.
138 Armstrong 48 F.3d at 1511. Former Solicitor General Drew S. Days IH later explained
that
[t] hese prosecutions involved more than twice the quantity necessary to trigger ten-
year mandatory sentences; there were multiple sales involving multiple defendants,
thereby indicating a substantial crack cocaine ring;, there were multiple federal fire-
arms violations intertwined with the narcotics trafficking; the overall evidence was ex-
tremely strong, including audio and videotapes of the defendants; threats had been
made to the arresting officers by one of the defendants; and several of the defendants
had criminal histories including narcotics and firearm violations.
Drew S. Days, Race and the Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48
ME. L Rav. 179, 184 (1996).





144 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1484 (1996).
145 United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en ban, 48 F.3d
1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
146 The three officers were: a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency with 21
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States Attorneys. 147 The affidavits stated that race played no role in
the investigation of the named defendants and that the case had been
referred for federal prosecution because it involved provable crack
and firearms offenses that met the U.S. Attorney's guidelines.for fed-
eral prosecution. 148
The Government also submitted a list of all defendants charged
with violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 over a three-year period' 49
and sections from a published 1989 Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion report detailing the sociological patterns of crack use and distri-
bution in the United States.' 50
In response, the defendants submitted the affidavit of a defense
attorney alleging that an intake coordinator at a Pasadena drug treat-
ment center had told her that there are "an equal number of cauca-
sian users and dealers to minority users and dealers."15' Defendants
also submitted an affidavit from an experienced defense attorney
practicing in the Central District of California, alleging that, in his
experience and conversations with "judges, lawyers and defendants,"
many non-blacks are prosecuted for crack offenses in state court; how-
ever, he had never handled, known of, or heard of a single federal
crack cocaine case involving non-black defendants. 152 Additionally,
the defendants submitted a Los Angeles Times newspaper article report-
ing grave racial inequities in crack cocaine sentencing.153
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration on De-
cember 29, 1992.154 When the Government indicated that it would
years experience; a Special Agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms with
three years experience at the BATF and three additional years experience as a narcotics
officer, and a narcotics detective from the Inglewood, California, Police Department with
three years experience in narcotics. Armstrong, 21 F.3d at 1433.
147 Armstrong; 48 F.3d at 1511. For example, the Declaration from David C. Scheper,
Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the Major Crimes Unit in the United States
Attorney's Office for the Central District of California, delineated the criteria for charging
decisions. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484.
148 Brief for the United States at 16, Armstrong (No. 95-157).
149 IK/ The defendants' study indicated that approximately 2400 people were charged
with violations of §§ 841(a) (1) and 846, of whom eleven were non-black defendants
charged with crack cocaine violations. These eleven were all members of other racial or
ethnic minority groups. Armstrong 48 F.3d at 1517. The defendants claimed that all eleven
"appeared from their names to be Hispanic." Brief for Respondent Robert Rozelle at 48,
Armstrong (No. 95-157).
150 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484; Brief for the United States at 17, Armstrong, (No. 95-
157). The Prosecution also claimed many blacks had been tried at the state court level for
cocaine base offenses. Armstrong 48 F.3d at 1511.
151 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484 (quoting App. at 138); Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1518.
152 Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1512-18.
153 Jim Newton, Harsher Crack Sentences Criticized as Racial Inequity, LA. TiMES, Nov. 23,
1992, at Al; see also Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484.
154 Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en banc, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir.
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not comply with the court's discovery order, the court dismissed the
case and stayed execution of the dismissals pending appeal by the
Government.155 The district court judge declared,
The statistical data provided by the Defendant raises a question about
the motivation of the Government which could be satisfied by the gov-
ernment disclosing its criteria, if there is any criteria, for bringing this
case and others like it in Federal court. Without this criteria the statisti-
cal data is evidence and does suggest that the decisions to prosecute in
Federal court could be motivated by race. Without expert testimony,
this Court cannot conclude that the defendants' evidence is explained
by social phenomena.' 56
A divided, three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, find-
ing that the defendants' affidavit failed to establish a colorable basis
for ordering discovery because it lacked a showing that others simi-
larly situated were not prosecuted.' 57 The court of appeals quickly
voted to rehear the case en banc. The en banc panel affirmed the
district court's order of dismissal, 7-4, holding that a "colorable basis"
standard permits discovery when the defendants "introduce some evi-
dence tending to show the essential elements of selective prosecution
and the government fails to explain it adequately."' 5 8
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that, by itself, statistical evidence
about whom the government has prosecuted can establish a prima
facie case of race-based selective prosecution. 159 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit held that the discovery standard in selective prosecution de-
fenses should be lower than the standard necessary to prove a prima
facie case.' 60 As a result, the court of appeals believed that the Fed-
eral Public Defender study "raise[d] enough of a question to justify
further inquiry."' 6' The en banc panel stated that "a defendant is not
required to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute
others who are similarly situated." 62
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-




156 Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1512.
157 Armstrong, 21 F.3d at 1438.
158 Armstrong 48 F.3d at 1514.
'59 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1515.
162 Id. at 1516 (emphasis in original). The court of appeals rejected the analysis of
United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1992).
163 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1996).
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,' M Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
the defendants failed to "satisfy the threshold showing: They failed to
show that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated
suspects of other races." 165 Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed three
areas of a selective prosecution claim: (1) whether Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16 applies to selective prosecution defenses; 66
(2) what showing is necessary to prove discriminatory effect and dis-
criminatory purpose in selective prosecution claims;167 and (3) what
showing is necessary to obtain discovery in selective prosecution
claims.' 8
First, to establish a standard of proof in selective prosecution
claims, Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure Rule 16, which governs discovery in criminal cases. 16 9 The
defendants had argued that they should be permitted access to docu-
ments within the possession of the Government. 7 0 Rejecting the de-
fendants' interpretation, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Rule
16(a) (1) (C) "authorizes defendants to examine Government docu-
ments material to the preparation of their defense against the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, but not to the preparation of selective-
prosecution claims." 17 1 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "[u]nder
Rule 16(a) (1) (C), a defendant may examine documents material to
his defense, but, under Rule 16(a) (2), he may not examine Govern-
ment work product in connection with his case."17 2 The concern was
that the defendants' interpretation would open the door to unlimited
access of government documents, thereby circumventing the work
product discovery exemption under Rule 16(a) (2).173 This is because
the claim of selective prosecution does not bear on the merits of the
164 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg joined in the
opinion. Justice Breyerjoined in part.
165 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
166 Id. at 1485.
167 Id at 1487.
168 Id. at 1488.
169 Both parties raised the relevance of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 for the
first time in their briefs to the United States Supreme Court. Neither the district court nor
the court of appeals mentioned Rule 16 in their decisions. Id. at 1485.
170 Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 4048, Armstrong, (No. 95-157). The
defendants argued that they were not entitled to government documents pertaining to
their case per se, but to discovery of documents regarding their selective prosecution
claim. Id





offense but rather is an "independent [Constitutional] assertion." 174
Thus, the Court stated that "[b]ecause respondents' construction of
'defense' creates the anomaly of a defendant's being able to examine
all Government work product except the most pertinent, we find their
construction implausible."1 75 As construed by the majority, Rule 16
implicitly exempts selective prosecution defenses. 176
However, aside from Rule 16, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied
that he would permit discovery through the inherent powers of the
court 17 7 if the defendants met a "significant barrier" that was designed
to weed out insubstantial claims. 178
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the equal protection
issues raised by the defendants. 179 The defendants claimed that the
Government violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants claimed that the prosecutors targeted
African-Americans for prosecution in federal court, while whites were
prosecuted in state court. °80 In addition, the defendants argued that
they could prove selective prosecution without establishing that the
Government failed to prosecute others similarly situated.181
Noting that a "selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise
judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive,"' 82 ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist reviewed the derivation of a prosecutor's power from
the President's constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." 83 The majority thus expressed concern
"not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive con-
stitutional function." 84
Reaching back to Ah Sin v. Wittman,l8 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist
firmly asserted the requirement that "[t]o establish a discriminatory
effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."186 Although Ah
174 Id. at 1486.
175 Id. at 1485.
176 Id.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
178 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
179 d. at 1487.
180 Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 18-20, Armstrong (No. 95-157) (quoting
Mot. for Disc. and/or Dismissal of Indictment for Selective Prosecution at 2-3).
181 Id. at 66 ("Even if Christopher Lee Armstrong were the only person ever suspected of
selling crack in the Central District of California, federal officials would undeniably violate
the Constitution if they targeted, investigated, arrested, or selected him for prosecution
because he was black or Catholic or a Republican.").
182 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
183 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Armstrong 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
184 Armstrong 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
185 198 U.S. 500 (1905); see supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
186 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487. This standard reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
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Sin involved federal review of a state conviction, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist extended the requirement of proof of similar situation to federal
review of "one of the core powers of the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government, the power to prosecute."'18
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to the showing necessary
to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim.',, He advocated a
high threshold for proving discovery claims, stating, " [t] he justifica-
tions for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecu-
tion claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for
discovery in aid of such a claim."'8 9 Rejecting the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeal's analysis, ChiefJustice Rehnquist held that a "colorable ba-
sis" standard depends on evidence that the Government failed to pros-
ecute others who are similarly situated to the defendant.190 Without
such proof, the district court should not permit discovery. He stated
that the defendant should be required "to produce some evidence
that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been pros-
ecuted, but were not, and this requirement is consistent with our
equal protection case law."' 91 Thus, the Defendants' study, which
listed twenty-four defendants by race, whether they were prosecuted
for dealing cocaine as well as crack, and the status of each case, did
not meet the showing of different treatment of similarly situated per-
sons and thus was not sufficient to obtain discovery.' 9 2
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
In a brief concurrence, Justice Souter stated that he joined the
Court's opinion, but "in its discussion of Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 16 only to the extent of its application to the issue in this
case."'193
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburgjoined the majority opinion with the caveat that
Appeal's contention that a "colorable basis" for selective prosecution claims did not re-
quire proof that others similarly situated were not being prosecuted. United States v. Arm-
strong, 48 F.Sd 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
187 Armstrong; 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
188 Id. at 1488.
189 I.
190 Id. at 1489. Justice Rehnquist also rejected the Ninth Circuit's contention that selec-
tive prosecution analysis should start "'with the presumption that people of all races com-
mit all types of crimes-not with the premise that any type of crime is the exclusive
province of any particular racial or ethnic group.'" Id. at 1488-89 (quoting Armstrong; 48
F.d at 1516-17) (emphasis in original).
IM Id. at 1488.
192 Id
193 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489 (SouterJ., concurring).
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the opinion would be limited to only issues before the Court.194 She
stated that "the Court has decided a precise issue: whether the phrase
'defendant's defense,' as used in Rule 16(a) (1) (C), encompasses alle-
gations of selective prosecution." 195 Justice Ginsburg reserved judg-
ment on whether Rule 16(a) (1) (C) applies in "any other context"
such as to affirmative defenses unrelated to the merits.196
D. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer took issue with the
majority's limitation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 to doc-
uments related to the case-in-chief.1 97 He stated that "the language
and legislative history make clear that the Rule's drafters meant it to
provide a broad authorization for defendants' discovery, to be supple-
mented if necessary in an appropriate case."' 98 Justice Breyer dis-
agreed with the majority's exclusion of other defenses from Rule 16
(a) (1) (C),1 99 stating that "[t]o interpret the Rule in this limited way
creates a legal distinction that, from a discovery perspective, is arbi-
trary."200 Moreover, Justice Breyer warned that the majority's inter-
pretation would lead to "two full parallel sets of criminal discovery
principles,"20 ' a division that he believed was not justified from the
"linguistics" of the Rule.20 2
Justice Breyer also rejected the majority's concern regarding the
protection of work product.203 He noted that the work product doc-
trine is not absolute, that the "work-product exception may itself con-
tain implicit exceptions,"20 4 and that other rules of law can
supplement, authorize, or require the same information that Rule 16
could mandate.205
Finally, disagreeing with the majority, Justice Breyer asserted that
194 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
195 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
196 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
197 Armstrong; 116 S. Ct. at 1489 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
198 Id. at 1491 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
199 Justice Breyer delineated other forms of a "defendant's defense" such as: (1) an af-
firmative defense unrelated to the merits (such as a Speedy Trial Act claim); (2) an unre-
lated claim of constitutional right; and (3) a foreseeable surrebuttal to a likely Government
rebuttal. I&. at 1490 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
200 Id. at 1490 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
201 Id. (Breyer,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
202 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
205 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
204 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
205 Id. at 1491 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). E.g.,
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (constitutionally, discovery may be required in-
dependent of Rule 16). See supra note 86.
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the defendants sought information that was not work product.2 0 6
However, Justice Breyer passed on the issue of "whether in an appro-
priate case it would be necessary to find an implicit exception to the
language of Rule 16(a) (2), or to find an independent constitutional
source for the discovery, or to look for some other basis."207
In his conclusion, Justice Breyer stated that the discovery stan-
dard should be whether the requested documents are "material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense."208 He concurred in the
judgment because, in his opinion, the defendants failed to satisfy this
threshold.20 9 Moreover, Justice Breyer believed that it should have
been "fairly easy" for the defendants to find evidence of a government
policy to discriminate, 210 and the resulting prosecution of African-
Americans, accompanied by the non-prosecution of whites.211
E. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens opened by stating that he agreed with the Court
that Rule 16 is not the source of the power to make the discovery
inquiry.212 However, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's "im-
plicit assumption that a different, relatively rigid rule needs to be
crafted to regulate the use of this seldom-exercised inherent judicial
power."2 13 While the discovery order may have been broader than
necessary, Justice Stevens did not believe that the district court abused
its discretion.2 14
Justice Stevens stated that the discovery order should be contex-
tualized in light "of three circumstances that underscore the need for
judicial vigilance over certain types of drug prosecutions:" 215 (1) the
disparity in sentencing between crack cocaine offenses and other co-
caine offenses as promulgated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986;216
(2) the disparity in sentencing between state and federal courts;217
and (3) the statistical fact that crack cocaine sentencing falls dispro-
portionately upon African-Americans.2 18 In this context, Justice Ste-
206 Armstrong; 116 S. Ct. at 1491 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
207 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
208 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
209 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
210 IR. at 1492 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
211 Id. (Breyer, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
214 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215 Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
216 Id. at 1492-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
217 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1493 (StevensJ, dissenting).
218 Id. at 1493-94 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
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vens viewed the evidence presented by the defendants as credible,
thereby agreeing with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that
the district court judge acted "well within her discretion."219
V. ANALYSIS
The claim of selective prosecution treads a fine constitutional
line between the responsibilities of the Government to prosecute
criminals and the right of the accused to be accorded equal protec-
tion under the law. The Article II constitutional mandate that the
Executive Branch "take care" that the laws are enforced directly con-
flicts with the Equal Protection rights enunciated in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Fearing an encroachment on the Executive
Branch's power, the Supreme Court in Armstrong adopted a very high
threshold for obtaining discovery in selective prosecution defenses.
The effect of this high threshold is to practically merge the require-
ments for obtaining discovery in a selective prosecution claim with the
threshold for proving such a claim on the merits.
This note argues that this "clear evidence" test imposes a height-
ened pleading standard for those alleging claims of selective prosecu-
tion defenses, particularly for those alleging race-based selective
prosecution defenses. In Part A this note argues that a heightened
standard for discovery of government documents is not warranted by
the language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Part B argues
that the Court wrongly rejected the use of statistical studies to meet
the defendants' burden of proof. Part C argues that without statistical
studies, post-Armstrng defendants have little else to meet the "clear
evidence" threshold required by the Majority. Finally, Part D urges an
adoption ofJustice Marshall's "nonfrivolous" standard as the required
threshold showing to gain discovery on a selective prosecution claim.
The Court's decision in Armstrong will place a "crippling burden of
proof" 22 0 on defendants with legitimate claims, thereby installing a re-
gime where "prosecutors ... are now largely immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny."221
A. A HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY IS NOT WARRANTED BY
THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 16
The Ninth Circuit succinctly stated the importance of selective
prosecution defenses:
There are few claims as serious as the charge... that the government
219 1& at 1494 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
220 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
22] Id. at 92-93.
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has selected [defendants] for prosecution because of their race. Such
claims deserve the most careful examination by the courts so that the
prosecutorial power does not become a license to discriminate based on
race. Discovery is the crucial means by which defendants may provide a
trial judge with the information needed in order to determine whether a
claim of selective prosecution is meritorious.222
Yet, the Court rejected such determinations in Armstrong, giving prose-
cutors wide latitude in deciding whom to charge.2 23
First, the Court created a heightened standard for discovery in
selective prosecution defenses that is not warranted by the language in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. As Justice Breyer pointed out
in his partial concurrence, Rule 16 sets out a "three-part categoriza-
tion of the documents and other physical items that the Rule requires
the Government to make available to the defendant."224 This rule is
not discretionary, but a mandatory limitation on the government.
The majority, however, "creates a legal distinction that, from a discov-
ery perspective, is arbitrary"225 by setting up a separate system of dis-
covery for those items that relate to the case-in-chief from those
elements that relate to other defenses-even those defenses directly
based in the Constitution.22 6 As Justice Breyer correctly pointed out,
there are a number of different ways in which the majority's stance in
Armstrong influences motions to suppress and other areas that were
traditionally considered under the aegis of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16, but that are now no longer protected.2 27 Indeed, de-
fenses directly based on the Constitution should be accorded special
protection, similar to those accorded to Brady v. Maryland,228 and not
relegated to a second-class treatment simply because they do not di-
rectly bear on the case-in-chief. Constitutional defenses strike at the
core of our legal tradition and should be afforded as much protec-
tion-or even more-than the protection under the carefully con-
structed and liberalized Federal Rule 16.229
In the civil context, Leathenan v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli-
gence and Coordination Unit230 illustrates the Court's reluctance to infer
a heightened pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
222 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
223 Armstrong 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
224 Id. at 1490 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
225 id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
226 Id. at 1484-85.
227 See generally supra text accompanying notes 64-84.
228 See supra note 85.
229 See supra text accompnying notes 78-84.




cedure.23 1 In an unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court held that federal courts may not apply a "heightened
pleading standard," more stringent than the usual pleading require-
ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) in civil rights cases al-
leging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.232 The Court
contrasted the "short and plain statement" of Rule 8(a) with the
heightened pleading requirements in Rule 9(b), and found that Rule
9(b) does "address... the question of the need for greater particular-
ity in pleading certain actions, but doles] not include" the plaintiffs'
action.23 3
Yet, in this criminal context, the Majority in Armstrong adopted a
"clear evidence" test as a threshold requirement to obtaining discov-
ery-a stricter test than that created by the drafters of Federal Rule 16
and warranted by the language. The drafters intended to allow a lib-
eralized discovery process, one that would allow a defendant the op-
portunity to uncover facts that may be crucial to her defense. While
the ability to obtain discovery from the Government is not as complete
as in the civil context, the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been
liberalized since their creation to encourage the discovery of "mate-
rial" evidence. 234
Moreover, in enunciating a "clear evidence" test for discovery
into selective prosecution claims, the Court ignored the traditional
distinction between proving a prima facie case on the merits and prov-
ing the necessary showing to gain a discovery motion.2 35 The defend-
ants in Armstrong did not maintain that they were entitled to discovery
of any item that they wanted-they claimed that they met a "colorable
basis" threshold.2 36 Under the "colorable basis" threshold, they
sought discovery to find out if their contentions were meritorious.
In accordance with settled jurisprudence, the Majority correctly
turned to Wade v. United States2 37 for the determination that some
threshold showing is necessary to obtain discovery "to determine
whether the Government based its decision on the defendant's race
or religion,"238 but carried this threshold too far with the "demand-
ing"239 standard adopted. Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist stated that, " [ t] he justifications for a rigorous standard for the
231 Leathenrnan, 507 U.S. at 168.
232 Id. at 168-69.
233 Id.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
235 Armstrong; 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
236 See Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 37, Armstrong (No. 95-157).
237 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
238 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
239 Id. at 1486.
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elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspond-
ingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim."240
After following the clear precedent in Wayte that those claiming
that they were selectively prosecuted need to prove that the decision
to prosecute had a "discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by
a discriminatory purpose,"241 the Court essentially required the de-
fendants to prove these two prongs at the discovery stage under the
"clear evidence" standard.242 This standard, thus, is a prerequisite,
and heightened burden, for obtaining discovery from the
government.
Yet, there are crucial differences between the level of proof that
should be required at the discovery stage and the level of proof that
should be required to prove a prima facie case under our system of
liberal discovery. As the drafters of the modem Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure intended, discovery should be made available to help
defendants prepare their defense. The effect of the majority's inter-
pretation is to bar discovery that in other circumstances would satisfy
the criteria enumerated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
B. THE COURT WRONGLY REJECTED THE USE OF STATISTICAL STUDIES
TO PROVE INFERENCES OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT IN
PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING
In ordinary equal protection cases, a plaintiff alleging intentional
race discrimination need only demonstrate the claim by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 243 The majority in Armstrong nominally agreed
that selective prosecution defenses should be judged according to "or-
dinary equal protection standards,"244 but then proceeded to apply a
more stringent burden of proof than ordinary equal protection
cases.245 For example, the defendants in Armstrong urged the court to
follow Batson v. Kentucky,2 46 where "the special stringent evidentiary
requirements of Swain were 'inconsistent with standards that have
been developed.., for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal
Protection Clause.'"247
The defendants also urged the analogy with Batson because a
"claim of selective prosecution,... like a claim of systematic discrimi-
240 I& at 1488.
241 Id at 1487.
242 I& at 1486-88.
243 See Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 51, Armstrong (No. 95-157).
244 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 40-55.
246 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
247 Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 51, Armstrong (No. 95-157) (quoting
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)).
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nation under Swain v. Alabama, involves at most a far more limited
number of prosecutors, all working for the same agency and presuma-
bly responsive to similar pressures and incentives." 248
Similarly, the defendants in Armstrong urged an analogy with
Hunter v. Underwood 49 because "[e]qual protection principles pre-
clude the government from targeting a particular type of criminal act
for greater scrutiny, harsher penalties, or more vigorous prosecution
because most or all of the individuals who commit that offense are
racial minorities."250
In rejecting the defendants' analogies to Batson and Hunter, the
Court manipulated the holdings in these cases, claiming that Hunter
proved that there was "indisputable evidence that the state law had a
discriminatory effect on blacks as compared to similarly situated
whites.... Hunter thus affords no support for [the defendants'] posi-
tion."25 ' Moreover, the Court skirted the defendants' contentions re-
garding the applicability of Batson, failing to explain why the holding
in that case, which directly applied to the allegations of disparities in
treatment of races in the judicial system,2 52 should not be applied to
the facts in Armstrong.253
Perhaps, most significantly, in the wake of Armstrong, there is a
question regarding what weight of authority, if any, should be allo-
cated to statistical studies delineating racial disparity in the prosecu-
tion of blacks and whites.2 54 The Court flatly rejected the defendants'
study of prosecutorial inequity in the Central District of California,255
and foreclosed the defendants' ability to conduct further research
into the issue by denying the discovery motion.
Yet, there are studies detailing wide disparities in prosecution in
the Central District of California, and in numerous jurisdictions
throughout the United States. 25 6 For example, the Berk Study,257
248 Id. at 53.
249 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
250 Brief for Respondents Shelton Martin et al. at 40, Armstrong (No. 95-157).
251 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
253 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
254 See generallyJoseph L. Gastwirth & Tapan K. Nayak, Statistical Aspects of Cases Concern-
ing Racial Discrimination in Drug Sentencing. Stephens v. State and U.S. v. Armstrong, 87J.
CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 583 (1997).
255 Armstrong; 116 S. CL at 1488.
256 See Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. & American Civil Liber-
ties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19-26, Armstrong (No. 95-157)
(surveying state and federal task forces on racial disparities in sentencing); see also Dan
Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites, LA TIMFS, May 21, 1995, at Al.
257 Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminay Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in
Los Angeles, 6 FED. SENT. R. 36 (1993). Cf.Joseph E. Finley, Discrimination in Crack Charging
in Los Angles: Do Statistics Tell the Whole Truth About "Selective Prosecution?"6 FED. SENT. R. 113
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which came to light after the district court proceeding and therefore
was not part of the record in Armstrong,258 demonstrates that the
United States Attorney for the Central District of California has failed
to prosecute white offenders in federal court.259 Analyzing all arrests
for sale of cocaine base within Los Angeles County between January 1,
1990 and October 10, 1992, and all cocaine base cases prosecuted by
the United States Attorney for the Central District of California be-
tween 1988 and 1992, Professor Berk found that over a two-year pe-
riod, the United States Attorney did not charge one single white
person with the sale of crack cocaine. 260 In contrast, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney charged over 200 whites with the sale of co-
caine base during this same period.2 61
In United States v. Turner,2 62 a case following on the heels of the
Ninth Circuit's Armstrong decision, a study provided by the govern-
ment revealed that, of 149 person charged on crack-trafficking of-
fenses in the Central District of California between January 1992 and
March 1995, 109 (74.7%) were African-American, twenty-eight
(19.2%) were Hispanic, eight (5.5%) were Asian, three were unclassi-
fied, and one was white. 263
Additional studies have found similar results nationally. For ex-
ample, a House of Representatives Report recently stated that:
A 1992 Commission survey shows that only minorities were prosecuted
by crack offenses in more than half the federal court districts handling
crack cases. No Whites were federally prosecuted in 17 states and many
cities, including Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas and Los Ange-
les. Out of hundreds of cases, only one White was convicted in Califor-
nia, two in Texas, three in New York and two in Pennsylvania.2 6 4
These studies suggest that whites are more likely to be prosecuted
in state courts for crack cocaine offenses, while blacks are more likely
(1993) (criticizing the methodology of the Berk Study).
258 The Berk Study was developed in the course of litigation to support the defendant's
claims of selective prosecution in United States v.Jenkins, No. 91-632-TJH (C.D. Cal.). Berk
& Cambell, supra note 257, at 36.
259 Id. at 358.
260 Id.
261 The Government responded to the Berk Study at Oral Argument, where then-Solici-
tor General Drew S. Days stated that the study "proves only one thing that's relevant [to the
Armstrong case], that the defendants should have been able to acquire comparative infor-
mation." Official U.S. Supreme Court Transcript, 1996 WL 8850 at *19 (Feb. 26, 1996),
Armstrong (No. 95-157). However, despite the Government's contentions, it seems likely
that the Berk Study would be rejected by the Court as an insufficient showing.
262 901 F. Supp. 1491 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
263 Id. at 1495-96. The court concluded that the white defendant was "the last to be
selected for prosecution ... Had he not been included the number of whites prosecuted in
this district would still have been zero." Id. at 1496.
264 H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 20 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 335, 358.
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to be prosecuted in federal courts.
C. IN REJECTING THE USE OF STATISTICAL STUDIES TO OBTAIN
DISCOVERY, THE COURT LEFT SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
DEFENDANTS LITTLE ELSE WITH WHICH TO MEET THEIR
THRESHOLD SHOWING.
An important question left unanswered by the Court's opinion is
how defendants can prove selective prosecution claims without statisti-
cal studies. While the twenty-four person study of Armstrong was re-
jected,265 it seems unlikely that other, more in depth statistical studies
can meet the Court's "clear evidence" standard.266
One potential way in which a defendant could meet the "clear
evidence" threshold is an outright declaration of racial bias by a prose-
cutor, which is unlikely in almost all instances. 267 But, out of hun-
dreds of reported cases, this scenario has occurred only a handful of
times. 268 In addition, this leaves the success of a defendant's case to
the fortune of being in a jurisdiction with an outspoken prosecutor
rather than a silent prosecutor. The success of a defendant's case can-
not be left to the cunning of a prosecutor when other powerful evi-
dence exists to support claims of selective prosecution.
Thus, statistical studies seem as though they are the only mecha-
nism by which the wide range of variables affecting a decision to pros-
265 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct 1480, 1489 (1996).
266 For example, in the death penalty context, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987), rejected a study by David Baldus, Charles A. Pulaski and George Woodworth,
which was an extensive and rigorous statistical study. The authors concluded that prosecu-
tors seek and obtain the death penalty more frequently in cases involving white victims
than in cases involving blacks. Id. Using multiple regression analysis, 400 factors were
analyzed in 2400 homicide sentences. Id.
267 The Ninth Circuit rejected this formulation, stating that "[the availability of discov-
ery must not turn on the unlikely event that a federal prosecutor will confess to private
biases." United States v. Armstrong, 48 F. 3d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), revd
116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). One commentator noted prior to Armstrong- "Absent exceedingly
rare instances of racist remarks by prosecutors or formal policies that visibly target minori-
ties for harsher treatment, virtually the only method of documenting actual racial discrimi-
nation is through empirical studies that statistically demonstrate the disparate treatment of
minority defendants." Developments, supra note 96, at 1525. Yet, even such an outright dec-
laration of racial bias may not be unconstitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that
they "reserve[d] the question whether a defendant must satisfy the similarly situated re-
quirement" in cases where prosecutor admits a discriminatory intent. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct.
at 1488 n.3.
268 See, e.g., United States v. Camminsano, 433 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Mo. 1977); see also
Romero, supra note 101, at 2049-50. Fortunately, the Court refrained from adopting the
strange reasoning of one amicus who declared, "If a racist conspiracy were truly being
perpetrated over an extended period by a U.S. Attorney's Office, it is probable that some
employee or former employee would eventually be willing to come forward an expose it."




ecute an individual can be accounted for.2 6 9  For example,
proponents of statistical studies stress that the multiple regression
analysis used in many of these studies can control for hundreds of
potential factors.270 Thus, an expert using multiple regression can ac-
count for prosecutorial decisions to prosecute in federal over state
court. As one commentator has stated,
Because of the myriad of factors that could affect a prosecutor's decision
to bring charges, including the strength of the evidence, the culpability
of the offender, and the need to send out various enforcement signals,
courts are generally unwilling to infer a discriminatory intent from non-
enforcement statistics... Yet, it is usually difficult to get evidence of
discriminatory intent beyond such statistics.271
Additionally, defendants face the problem that data on which
they could potentially base their threshold showing of similar situation
is very difficult to obtain. The Court suggested that the defendants in
Armstrong could have "investigated whether similarly situated persons
of other races were prosecuted by the State of California, were known
to federal law enforcement officers but were not prosecuted in federal
court."2 72 Similarly, Justice Breyer also agreed that "it should have
been fairly easy" for the defendants to obtain this information.273
Yet, it is not clear from the Court's opinion where the defendants
in this case could obtain information from law enforcement authori-
ties regarding those arrestees who were not prosecuted. Indeed, it
appears that data regarding those "similarly situated" is precisely what
the defendants attempted to uncover through their discovery motion.
As the defense counsel stated at oral argument, "The State [of Califor-
nia] court system is broken up into many, many different courts. In
fact there is no centralized record-keeper of crack and powder co-
caine cases, . . . and the information is not accessible to defendants
with ease, and in some instances is not accessible at all."2 74
There are also wider-ranging problems for defendants in gather-
ing data regarding prosecutorial decision-making and sentencing.
269 See Develments, supra note 96, at 1545 ("The feasibility of such empirical studies
makes the need for showing direct evidence of discriminatory purpose much less compel-
ling in the racial selective prosecution context.").
270 Id.
271 Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L.
Rv. 1365, 1373 (1987).
272 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1489 (1996).
273 Id. at 1492 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
274 Official U.S. Supreme Court Transcript, 1996 WL 88550, at *37 (Feb. 26, 1996),
Armstrong (No. 95-157). Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys' Office in the Central District of
California is ten times the size of the Federal Public Defender. Brief for Respondents
Shelton Martin et al. at 30, Armstrong (No. 95-157). The defendants also claimed that the
Government stores this information on computer. Id. at 75-78.
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Although the United States Sentencing Commission publishes infor-
mation about federal defendants sentenced for cocaine base offenses,
states do not keep such detailed statistics. 27 5 Many states do not distin-
guish between cocaine base and cocaine power offenses at either the
penalty or the record-keeping levels.276 According to former Solicitor
General Drew Days III, in response to a request for the Sentencing
Commission to produce data on cocaine base offenders, only three
states were able to provide the total number of offenses handled in
one year.277 Moreover, information on a given defendant's race is not
usually ascertainable from the public court files.2 78
Indeed, information is often extremely difficult for defendants to
obtain, especially for the majority of defendants who are represented
by Federal Public Defenders and have limited time and resources. 279
For example, the Berk study was compiled after a district court or-
dered the payment of a paralegal to organize the statistics-a task that
took eighteen months to complete.28 0 Under the Court's interpreta-
tion of the threshold showing, a district court would not have the in-
herent powers to order such compilation; the defendant would have
to already have such statistics complied when presenting a discovery
motion to the court.
As a result, the opinion in Armstrong establishes a virtual catch-22
for a defendant seeking to prove selective prosecution. The defend-
ant cannot obtain discovery unless he first proves the prima facie case.
But there is virtually no way for the defendant to prove the case with-
out some discovery of those "similarly situated" to him whom prosecu-
tors chose not to prosecute for similar offenses. Thus, despite Justice
Rehnquist's reassurances that "the similarly situated requirement does
275 Days, supra note 137, at 188.
276 Id.
277 Id
278 Brief for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund Inc. & Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union in Support of Respondents at 41, Armstrong (No. 95-157). The
Amicae point out that the United States advanced a similar argument for retaining Swain v.
Alabama-a view that was later rejected by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. The
Government stated at the time, "[W]e also find unpersuasive the argument that Swain
makes it unduly difficult to demonstrate impermissible use of peremptory challenges even
when such abuse practices are actually going on .... Moreover, public defender's offices
and defense counsel's organizations are well situated to collect the requisite statistics."
Brief of the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Swain v. Alabama, 408
U.S. 936 (1972) (No. 69-5044), quoted in Brief for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, Inc. & American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Respondents at 42 n.35, Arm-
strong (No. 95-157).
279 Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. & American Civil Liberties
Union in Support of Respondents at 27-29, Armstrong (No. 95-157).




not make a selective prosecution claim impossible to prove,"281 the
Court has left defendants with little room to maneuver.
A survey of the post-Armstrong cases reveals that a high barrier is
in effect. While discovery requests to prove selective prosecution cases
were rarely granted prior to Armstrong,282 there has been a streamlin-
ing of such requests since the decision. For example, in United States
v. Olvis,283 the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants' claim of selec-
tive prosecution because they did not meet the "'rigorous' standard
recently articulated by the Supreme Court to obtain discovery... 28 4
The Fourth Circuit flatly rejected the defendants' statistical study, stat-
ing that it "suffers from the same fatal defect that the Court recog-
nized in Armstrong... 'Without an appropriate basis for comparison,
raw data about the percentage of black cocaine defendants proves
nothing."2 85 Thus, the Supreme Court has set up a threshold that is
too difficult for most defendants to meet, even those with potentially
meritorious claims.
D. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED JUSTICE MARSHALL'S
"NONFRIVOLOUS STANDARD" FROM WA "i-E . UNITED STA TES.
Noticeably absent from either the majority or the minority opin-
ions was any explicit references to Justice Marshall's "nonfrivolous-
ness" standard for discovery and his three-prong test laid out in his
dissent in Wayte.286 This three-prong test requires that a defendant
prove that he is a member of a definable class, that a disproportionate
number of the class was selected for prosecution, and that the selec-
tion was subject to abuse.2 87 Justice Marshall's test would provide a
more balanced threshold standard for defendants to meet. While en-
abling defendants seeking to obtain discovery from the government to
meet a lower threshold of proof before the Court addresses their
281 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996). The only case cited by the
ChiefJustice to support this claim is Yiak Wo--a 1886 case. Id.
282 See BriefAmicus Curiae of Former Law Enforcement Officials and Police Orgs. et a].
in Support of Respondents at 43, Armstrong (No. 95-157) (stating that few federal cases
have ever reached the discovery threshold).
283 97 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 1996).
284 1& at 741. The court rejected defendants' arguments that they were selectively prose-
cuted. The defendants presented evidence that of the more than 80 people allegedly in-
volved in the drug trafficking of marijuana and crack cocaine in this operation, only 25
were prosecuted-all of whom were black. The defendants also presented statistics stating
that out of the 285 of the 312 cases involving crack cocaine offenses since 1992 where the
defendants race was known, 90% of those tried were African-American. Id.
285 Id
286 470 U.S. at 624-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 87-
95.
287 470 U.S. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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claims on the merits, it would not result in a floodgate of claims.
One of the benefits ofJustice Marshall's proposal is that it would
in no way limit the government from seeking in camera reviews or pro-
tective orders to lessen the burden upon the government and would
allow for evaluation of the propriety of further discovery if neces-
sary.2 88 It also accounts for potential margins of error in empirical
studies and accounts for the existence (or lack thereof) or
prosecutorial guidelines. 289 Moreover, it also allows the case to be
placed within the proper context of larger racial disparities in
sentencing.290
Applying Justice Marshall's three-prong test to the facts in Arm-
strong, the defendants would have met the "nonfrivolous" threshold to
obtain discovery.291 First, they meet the requirement that the defend-
ant must be a member of a recognizable, distinct class, since they are
African-Americans, the prototypical example.m 2 Second, in proving
that a disproportional number of their class are selected for investiga-
tion and prosecution, the statistical study could suffice. However,
even assuming that the Court agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist that
the study is inadequate, 293 the newspaper article alone could raise a
"nonfrivolous inference." 294 The affidavits would serve this purpose as
well. 295 And third, in claiming that the selection procedure is capable
of being abused, the defendants indicated that the charging guide-
lines of the Central District's U.S. Attorney's Office were
unavailable.2 96
It is important to note, however, that without an explicit refer-
ence, Justice Stevens's dissent focused almost exclusively upon the
third prong of the nonfrivolous test-the totality of the circumstances
test. Expressing a need for "judicial vigilance over certain types of
drug prosecutions,"297 Justice Stevens emphasized the statistics
288 Developments, supra note 96, at 1553.
289 Id
290 See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
291 470 U.S. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
292 See generaly Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 551-57 (1979).
293 Justice Marshall's dissent in Wayte did not address the sufficiency of statistical studies
to prove disproportionate impact.
294 See supra text accompanying notes 92-94; Newton, supra note 153, at Al.
295 Justice Stevens took issue with the Majority's labeling of the affidavits as hearsay. See
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1494 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296 See also Developments, supra note 96, at 1552-53 ("Under this conception of the stan-
dard, a minority defendant who alleges selective prosecution and submits an empirical
study would meet the first two elements. . ., but would not meet the susceptible-to-abuse
element without also submitting evidence that the prosecutor's office in question had inad-
equate procedural protections against discrimination.").
297 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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presented by the defendants as well as the affidavits claiming racial
bias in the prosecution of black defendants in the Central District of
California.298 In addressing the a totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the defendants' prosecutions, Justice Stevens plunged head-
on into the politically charged disagreements regarding racial bias in
the sentencing guidelines, an area in which the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches of the Federal Government have had considerable disa-
greement in recent years.2 9 This is an area that the rest of the Court
was unwilling to enter, more concerned with a departmentalist separa-
tion of powers.300
Finally, it should be emphasized that those alleging race-based
claims of selective prosecution have different claims than those alleg-
ing other constitutional violations, due to the special history of race
discrimination in our country.30' As the Court stated in Rose v. Mitch-
e/i "Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is espe-
cially pernicious in the administration of justice."3 02 Thus, "[r]acism
has the potential to affect every felony charging decision. This situa-
tion is fundamentally different from the nonracial contexts out of
which current selective prosecution doctrine arose."303 Selective pros-
ecution, while disturbing in any setting, flies in the face of the protec-
tions guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
deserves special attention.
VI. CONCLUSION
No defendant since Yick Wo in 1886 has been successful in prov-
ing a race-based claim of selective prosecution.30 4 Thus, in practical
terms, the Supreme Court's opinion will not stem a tide of selective
prosecution defenses. These claims were generally not succeeding
prior to Armstrong. Now, with the heightened evidentiary standards
enunciated by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, a selective prosecution defense
is even more difficult to prove. The legacy of the Armstrong decision
will be an increased hostility to the use of statistical evidence to prove
298 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299 See supra note 112; see generallyJefferson Morley, Crack in Black & White; Politics, Profits
and Punishment in America ; Drug Eonomy, WASH. PosT, Nov. 19, 1995, at C1.
300 See, e.g., Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
301 See generally Charles R. Lawrence M, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Ruv. 317 (1987).
302 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).
303 Developments, supra note 96, at 1545.
304 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488-89; see Brief of Amicus Curiae of Former Law Enforce-




discrimination, and the "crippling burden of proof"305 placed on de-
fendants that insures that prosecutors will continue to be "largely im-
mune from constitutional scrutiny."3 0 6
MELISSA L. JAMPOL
3105 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
305 Id. at 93.
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